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Worldview defenseA large body of evidence supports the key tenet of terror management theory (TMT) that people manage
death anxiety by defending cultural ingroups. However, surprisingly little is known about the motivational
processes driving this effect. Given that mortality salience (MS) as well as control deprivation instigate
ingroup defense, it is possible that MS effects on ingroup defense are fueled by the motivation to restore control
that has been shattered by the inevitability of death. Study 1 revealed that control motivation – operationalized
as illusory pattern perception –mediatesMS and control deprivation effects on ingroup defense. Study 2 showed
that thoughts about lacking control mediate MS and control deprivation effects on perceptions of randomness.
Study 3 compared control motivation – operationalized as state need for structure – and death-thought accessi-
bility (i.e., the main mediator candidate in TMT) in terms of mediation of MS and control deprivation effects on
ingroup defense. Replicating the results of Study 1, controlmotivationmediated bothMS and control deprivation
effects, whereas death-thought accessibility failed to mediate any effects. Using different operationalizations of
control motivation, these studies provide broad mediational evidence for the notion that MS-induced
ingroup defense serves the function of compensating for the loss of control that is inherent in the inescapability
of death.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.“It is possible to provide security against other afﬂictions, but as
far as death is concerned, we men all live in a city without walls.”
Epicurus (n.d.)
According to the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus, a particularly
problematic aspect of death is the inexorableness of the ephemerality
of being or, in other words, human defense- and helplessness in the
face of death. Similar ideas have been brought forward by cultural, Social Psychology, Hellbrunner
kin).
Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-NDanthropologists and psychologists investigating how people cope
with uncontrollable aspects of their lives, such as the inevitable tran-
sience of existence (Becker, 1973; Fritsche, Jonas, & Fankhänel, 2008;
Pyszczynski, Sullivan, & Greenberg, in press). This line of research
has converged in demonstrating that mortality salience (MS) motivates
people to engage in symbolic defenses against the existential fear of
their ever-impending demise. Hundreds of studies have shown that
people defend the worldviews of their cultural ingroups (e.g., through
ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination) and strive for self-
esteem (by meeting the ingroups' behavioral standards) after contem-
plating their mortality (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010). Given that
the identiﬁcation with cultural ingroups is conceived as a multiply
determined phenomenon that may serve a variety of needs, including
the needs for control (Fritsche et al., 2008) and self-preservation
(Greenberg, Solomon, & Arndt, 2008), and these needs are eventually license.
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2006), the question arises which motivational processes underlie MS-
induced ingroup defense. Focusing on the role of death's uncontrollabil-
ity in the emergence of ingroup defense (Fritsche et al., 2008), the aim of
the present research is to investigate whether MS effects on ingroup
defense can be explained by the motivation to restore a sense of control
that has been shattered by the unavoidability of mortality. This
question is investigated using a mediational approach that should yield
new insights into the motivational underpinnings of MS and control
deprivation by examining whether MS and control deprivation effects
on ingroup defense are distinguishable with respect to their mediating
processes.
Ingroup defense as a mechanism for terror management
According to terror management theory (TMT), people defend and
support their cultural ingroups (e.g., through ingroup bias; Greenberg
et al., 1990) in order to symbolically transcend death by identifying
with entities that will continue to exist long after the individual's per-
sonal death (Greenberg et al., 2008). TMT posits that the awareness of
life's relentless evanescence entails a potential for paralyzing terror,
which is held at bay by maintaining the ingroup's cultural worldview
– because it provides people with a sense of order, meaning, and per-
manence – and behaving in accordance with the standards prescribed
by this worldview, thereby obtaining self-esteem. Thus, TMT suggests
that the ultimate function of ingroup defense is to soothe existential
anxiety. However, TMT also proposes that people possess a basic mo-
tive for control (or effectance) (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon,
1998; Pyszczynski et al., in press). It is argued that compensatory
responses to MS – most prominently, the extensively investigated
group-related type of cultural worldview defense, namely the defense
of cultural ingroups (henceforth: ingroup defense) – can serve the
ultimate function of protecting from existential terror by means of ful-
ﬁlling the more proximate function of restoring a sense of control.
Since reminding people of their uncontrollable demise is assumed
to undermine the existential security that is afforded by a stable sense
of personal control, thereby increasing the need to afﬁrm this psycholog-
ical resource, ingroup defense may be not only conceived as an ultimate
strategy for terror management but also as a proximate mechanism for
control restoration (Pyszczynski et al., 1998, in press). In other words,
MS-induced efforts in control restoration may help the individual “to
feel that he controls his life and his death” (Becker, 1973, p. 55). Notably,
this perspective is consistent with control-related theorizing on the
psychological function of ingroup defense (Fritsche, Jonas, & Kessler,
2011).
Ingroup defense as a mechanism for control restoration
Control theorists have long posited that the desire to perceive control
(i.e., inﬂuence) over one's social environments and outcomes constitutes
a primary and fundamental motivating force in human life (deCharms,
1983; Kelley, 1971; White, 1959). More recently, the compensatory
control model proposed that this desire has its roots in a more basic
and inclusive motivation to defend against perceptions of randomness
and chaos in the environment (Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky,
2009). Put differently, this model traces people's control strivings to
the need to perceive order or structure, thus preventing unsettling
perceptions of randomness. Importantly, this reasoning implies that
personal control (i.e., perceiving the self as in control) and external con-
trol (i.e., perceiving external systems, such as the cultural ingroup, as
in control), are interchangeable means of preserving a desired level of
perceived order (vs. randomness) in the environment (Shepherd, Kay,
Landau, & Keefer, 2011). This perspective thus views the need for con-
trol, or control motivation, as functionally equivalent to the need for
order or structure, because the critical issue is that the world per se is
under control (i.e., orderly/nonrandom). In terms of order, it does notmatter under whose control the world is, be it the self or external
systems. The term perceived control can thus be likened to the term
perceived order as well.
According to this line of reasoning, experiences or reminders of low
control (i.e., control deprivation) should lead to efforts in regaining a
sense of control by maintaining psychological structures that are capa-
ble of lending order to one's environment (i.e., control restoration; Kay,
Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 2010). Accordingly, threats to personal
control have been reported to elicit motivated perceptions of order
(i.e., illusory pattern perception) — operationalized as superstitious
and conspiratorial thinking (Whitson&Galinsky, 2008). This perceptual
compensatory control mechanism may represent the most elementary
manifestation of control motivation (Kay et al., 2009).
On a higher-order level, people may regulate levels of perceived
control by using social groups as sources of external control. It has
been argued that a major psychological beneﬁt of social ingroups is
that they can provide the individual with a notion of vicarious control
— the perception that the world is under control by powerful others
(Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). Accordingly, Fritsche et al.
(2008) reasoned that ingroup defense following control deprivation
can be understood as an attempt to regain control on the group-level
(i.e., group-based control restoration). In line with this reasoning, low
trait and state control has been found to increase various instances of
ingroup defense, including ethnocentrism, prejudice toward outgroups,
and ingroup bias (Agroskin & Jonas, 2010; Fritsche et al., 2008, Fritsche
et al., 2013). This functional interpretation of ingroup defense as a com-
pensatory control mechanism is consistent with TMT, which also sug-
gests that people can maintain perceptions of control by clinging to
their ingroups (Pyszczynski et al., in press). Thus, given that ingroup de-
fense may fulﬁll the function of control restoration, control motivation
(i.e., the need to restore control) could play a critical mediational role
in MS effects on ingroup defense.Control motivation and MS effects on ingroup defense
Theorizing on control (Fritsche et al., 2008) as well as TMT
(Pyszczynski et al., in press) have recently converged in proposing
that death represents the most intense instance of control deprivation.
The inevitability of death may fundamentally frustrate the control mo-
tive, since neither the time nor the way of one's death is controllable or
predictable (apart from suicide). Against this backdrop, it seems likely
that the problem of death is accompanied by a deep-seated problem
of control, which becomes virulent in the course ofMS inductions, caus-
ing ingroup defense.Methodologically speaking, this approach suggests
a mediational model, in which control deprivation is involved by MS
inductions, subsequently leading to an increase in control motivation
(i.e., the need to perceive order and prevent perceptions of random-
ness). This control motivation, in turn, should trigger efforts in control
restoration, such as the defense of cultural ingroups that can lend
order to one's environment.
Initial evidence for this control-related motivational process model
of MS-based ingroup defense stems from several studies of Fritsche et
al. (2008) who showed that ingroup defense occurs only following re-
minders of uncontrollable death (traditional MS) but not reminders of
controllable death (i.e., suicide). Thus, the traditional MS induction
(Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989) may in-
volve a loss of control, which should increase control motivation; the
rise of control motivation, in turn, may ﬁnally result in the afﬁrmation
of sources of external control, such as cultural ingroups. This interpreta-
tion would be able to explain why ingroup defense did not arise after a
kind of MS that is at least partly devoid of control deprivation – suicide
salience – contrary to the classic control deprivation-immanent MS
type. So, if MS in fact entails control deprivation, then MS and control
deprivation effects on control-conferring outcomes, such as ingroup
defense, should be of a similar nature. In other words, MS and control
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that are suitable for control restoration.1
Comparing MS and control deprivation effects on control-
conveying outcomes
There are a few studies that directly compared MS and control
deprivation effects on control-providing outcomes. In line with our
reasoning, Burris and Rempel (2004) found increased ingroup defense
after both MS and control deprivation relative to a control condition.
Moreover, MS augmented the afﬁrmation of constructs speciﬁcally
designed to convey symbolic immortality relative to control depriva-
tion, whereas control deprivation uniquely increased the appeal of
order-offering worldview aspects compared with MS and uncertainty
(Shepherd et al., 2011).2 Thus, in addition to demonstrating that control
deprivation effects on order/control-providing outcomes are equal to
(Burris & Rempel, 2004) or even stronger than MS effects (Shepherd
et al., 2011), this research suggests that the need to restore a sense of
control is conceptually and empirically distinct from the need to attain
symbolic immortality. Notably, these ﬁndings are consistent with the
TMT view that although concerns about death and lacking control are
functionally interrelated in that both can lead to control-restorative
compensatory responses due to the anxiety-soothing function of per-
ceived control, these concerns are not wholly reducible to one another
(Pyszczynski et al., in press). This implies that the need to regain a
sense of order (i.e., control motivation) is likely to make a unique con-
tribution to the emergence of MS/control deprivation-based ingroup
defense.
Mediators of MS and control deprivation effects
One of the most promising approaches to testing the idea that
MS-induced ingroup defense may be fueled by MS-induced control
motivation may consist in the exploration of possible mediators of
MS and control deprivation effects. Our control-related motivational
process model suggests that both MS and control deprivation effects
on ingroup defense should be mediated by processes reﬂecting control
motivation. Up to now, not much research has been dedicated to the
question of which variables may mediate MS and control deprivation
effects. TMT views the accessibility of death-related thoughts as poten-
tially underlying MS effects: “In the face of mortality awareness DTA
[death-thought accessibility] mediates, or at least partially mediates,
worldview and self-esteem defensiveness” (Hayes, Schimel, Arndt, &
Faucher, 2010, p. 716). Proponents of this hypothesis refer to a similar
time course of death-thought accessibility and worldview defense,
since levels of death-thought accessibility were found to run parallel
toworldviewdefense levels followingMS, requiring a delay anddistrac-
tion tomount. Furthermore, threats toworldview and self-esteem have
been shown to increase death-thought accessibility; worldviewdefense
and self-esteemboosts, conversely, decreaseddeath-thought accessibil-
ity (for an overview of death-thought accessibility research seeHayes et1 We would like to stress at this point that our approach has nothing to say about MS
outcomes that are unsuitable for control restoration. Thus, the enormous amount of
TMT literature on outcomes argued to reﬂect a desire for literal or symbolic death-
transcendence (e.g., desire for offspring, Fritsche et al., 2007; symbolic immortality,
Shepherd et al., 2011), or other outcomes unrelated to control, is not proposed to be
explainable with our approach (see also Routledge & Vess, 2012).
2 It is noteworthy that this empirical distinguishability of control deprivation and
uncertainty effects is complemented by a conceptual distinguishability. Whereas lack-
ing control involves lacking inﬂuence over outcomes and environments (e.g., Kay,
Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008), uncertainty has been primarily conceptual-
ized as identity-related confusion (who am I, what should I do?; Van den Bos, 2009).
Likewise, control deprivation can be distinguished from meaning deprivation, since
meaninglessness has been conceived as a very basic epistemic process — violation of
expected relations (Proulx & Heine, 2010). Note that controlling outcomes requires
knowing relations in one's environment but is not identical to this purely epistemic
phenomenon.al., 2010). However, the speciﬁc time course of delayed death-thought
accessibility increase after MS was not replicated by recent research
(Traﬁmow&Hughes, 2012), suggesting thatmediational studies should
clarify whether death-thought accessibility really underlies MS effects
on ingroup defense.
Yet, to our knowledge, there are only two published articles
reporting statistical mediation tests with regard to MS effects, yielding
heterogeneous results. Fransen, Fennis, Pruyn, and Das (2008; Study 1)
found death-thought accessibility to mediate the increase in spending
intentions after an explicit exposure to an insurance brand due to
heightened death-thought accessibility in the exposure condition and
a positive relationship between death-thought accessibility and spend-
ing intentions. Note, however, that heightened spending intentions are
not clearly indicative of ingroup defense and do not constitute a typical
outcome in the TMT literature (at least not as typical as ingroup
defense). In contrast, Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, and Vermeulen
(2009) failed to demonstrate mediation by death-thought accessibility.
Although death-thought accessibility was augmented following MS, it
moderated rather than mediated the effect of MS on ingroup defense.
Thus, it is still unclear which processes underlie the emergence of
ingroup defense after MS.
With respect to control deprivation effects, similarly few studies ex-
ploring potential mediators exist to date. Fritsche et al. (2008, Study 6)
found that a personal control deprivation effect on ingroup support was
mediated by group-related control motivation (i.e., the need to feel
strong through the ingroup). Furthermore, Kay et al. (2008) and Kay,
Shepherd, Blatz, Chua, and Galinsky (2010) identiﬁed mediators
reﬂecting concerns about order and structure for control deprivation
effects on the belief in an order-providing God. Moreover, the motiva-
tion to perceive order (i.e., illusory pattern perception) was revealed to
mediate control deprivation effects on increased preference for order-
offering theories (Rutjens, van Harreveld, van der Pligt, Kreemers, &
Noordewier, 2013, Study 4). Yet, both latter ﬁndings are not speciﬁcally
related to ingroup defense, implying that mediational evidence on con-
trol deprivation effects on ingroup defense is very scarce. Summing up,
it seems unclear a) which motivational processes underlie MS and con-
trol deprivation effects, and, crucially, b) whether these are the same or
different mediators. Addressing this research gap, the present work
comparatively explores mediators of MS and control deprivation effects
on ingroup defense to shed light on their motivational and cognitive
underpinnings.
The current research
Speciﬁcally, we aimed at testing whether both MS and control
deprivation effects on ingroup defense are mediated by control moti-
vation. Drawing on the compensatory control model, which views the
need to perceive order and prevent perceptions of randomness as the
primary motivation behind control deprivation effects (Kay et al.,
2009), we operationalized control motivation as illusory pattern per-
ception (Study 1) and state need for structure (Study 3). We also tested
whether both MS and control deprivation effects might be moderated
by self-esteem, since prior TMT research has determined that high
self-esteem can buffer MS effects because it may provide symbolic
death-transcendence (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Moreover, TMT
posits that levels of self-esteemmay reﬂect levels of perceived personal
control (Pyszczynski et al., in press), which might thus buffer control
deprivation effects, too.
To test this mediational model, we compared the effects of MS and
control deprivation relative to another aversive condition on illusory
pattern perception and ingroup defense in Study 1. Study 2 was
designed to test whether perceptions of randomness emerge following
MS and control deprivation, and whether this effect is mediated by
thoughts about lacking control (or death). Finally, Study 3 included a
death anxiety-speciﬁc mediator (death-thought accessibility) in addi-
tion to controlmotivation (state need for structure) in order to compare
4 A score of the participants' agreement with the interpretations was obtained by
forming a composite scale of the ratings of the interpretations. The agreement with
the interpretations did not vary as a function of the manipulation, F(2,113) = 2.79,
p = .07. Moreover, treating this variable as a covariate in separate analyses did not
change the results reported below in a substantial way. Therefore, we will not mention
this variable further.
5 A pilot study demonstrated the validity of this manipulation using a procedure that
will be portrayed in full detail within the framework of Study 2 where the same meth-
od was utilized in the context of another but similar manipulation. Most importantly,
thoughts of low control were more pronounced in the MS and control deprivation con-
ditions than in the winter condition and mediated MS and control deprivation effects
on perceptions of randomness, whereby death cognition, despite being most pro-
nounced in the MS condition, was not related to randomness perceptions (Agroskin
& Jonas, 2011).
6 Whereas positive affectivity (ten items; α = .82) was not affected by the manipu-
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defense. To our knowledge, these studies are the ﬁrst to systematically
explore and comparatively test mediators in threat compensation
research. We employed diverse samples in terms of nationality
(Germans and Austrians) and profession (soldiers and students) to
test our mediational hypotheses.
Study 1
In Study 1, we tested the hypothesis that MS effects on ingroup
defense are rooted in control motivation that is activated in conse-
quence of the control loss inherent in death. This view would suggest
control motivation to mediate both MS and control deprivation effects
on ingroup defense. A new induction method modeled after Fritsche,
Jonas, Niesta Kayser, and Koranyi (2010) was created, in which partici-
pants were confronted with short poems addressing the existential
predicaments that are posed by death and lacking control. The out-
comes were illusory pattern perception (mediator) and ingroup de-
fense (criterion).
Moreover, we assessed the MS effects buffering role of self-esteem
(Harmon-Jones et al., 1997), which could also apply to control depriva-
tion effects, because self-esteemmay represent a reﬂective gauge of per-
sonal control (Fritsche et al., 2008; Pyszczynski et al., in press), given the
conceptual similarity and high positive associations between these con-
structs (Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002). More speciﬁcally, the hy-
draulic hypothesis of the compensatory control model suggests that
people want to maintain a preferred level of perceived order and struc-
ture in their environment, not that they want as much order as possible
(Kay et al., 2010b). Therefore, high self-esteem (personal control) should
function as a dispositional buffer against the need to restore perceptions
of order following control deprivation. Moreover, self-esteemmaymod-
erate the relationship between illusory pattern perception and ingroup
defense because illusory pattern perception may provide perceptual
control (Galinsky, Whitson, Huang, & Rucker, 2012). Thus, persons
with high self-esteemor personal control should not strive for additional
external control (via ingroup defense), after they had been given the
opportunity to afﬁrmperceptual control (via illusory pattern perception).
Personswith lowself-esteem(i.e., lowpersonal control), by contrast,may
want to restore as much external control as possible after MS/control
deprivation, thus afﬁrming perceptual3 as well as group-based control.
To sum up, we expected both MS and control deprivation to increase
ingroup defense via the motivation to perceive order (illusory pattern
perception), but only for persons with low self-esteem (see Fig. 1).
Method
Participants and design
116 students/soldiers from the University of the Federal Armed
Forces Munich, Germany were recruited via a university mailing list.
They took part in an online study about topics associatedwith psychology
of literature and personality psychology. Their mean age was 23.6 years
(SD = 2.4; range: 20–29), 24.3% of the participants were female. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to conditions in a moderated mediational
between-participants design (see Fig. 1).
Procedure and materials
Manipulation. The online questionnaire opened with instructions
followed by some sociodemographic questions. Then, participants3 However, note that illusory pattern perception may not provide a strong sense of
control, as control-deprived people were found to strive for additional control by pre-
ferring order-offering theories, after having got the opportunity to engage in illusory
pattern perception (Rutjens et al., 2013, Study 4). It may thus be that illusory pattern
perception primarily reﬂects control motivation (not restoration), but also provides a
slight sense of order (Galinsky et al., 2012), which, however, does not sufﬁce as control
restoration after a profound loss of control.received themanipulation which was newly created using the interpre-
tation of poems as a method of induction. We used three short German
poems that were very similar in terms of length and form to induce feel-
ings and thoughts associated with death/lack of control/winter. Winter
was used as an aversive control topic akin to the dental pain condition
frequently used in TMT research (e.g., Jonas, Greenberg, & Frey, 2003).
Participants were asked to read the poem carefully and relate to it emo-
tionally, as MS effects mainly appear when information is processed by
the emotion-related experiential system (Simon et al., 1997). After
that, participants were asked what the poet might have intended to ex-
press; theywere also asked to give their own interpretation of the poem.
Then, they were asked to provide their associations with the poem, es-
pecially images, sounds, smells, and moods. Finally, three bogus inter-
pretations of the poem by other students paraphrasing its content
were presented and the participants were asked to indicate to what ex-
tent they concurredwith these interpretations on a 10-point scale (from
1 = not at all to 10 = totally).4 Using these tasks a deep and thorough
processing of the poem in a rather emotional way was ensured. The
poems' lengths ranged from 14 to 24 words. The poems are presented
in Appendix A in an English translation (please note that the unique lin-
guistic quality of the original German-language poems could not be con-
served in the literal English translation).5
As a ﬁller questionnaire, we next included the 20-item Positive
and Negative Affect Schedule (Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann, & Tausch,
1996; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).6Illusory pattern perception (mediator).Next, the illusory pattern percep-
tion measure was presented. It was embedded in a randomized block
containing two further trait questionnaires, which should ensure a sufﬁ-
ciently long delay between manipulation and dependent variable
(ingroup defense), as a meta-analysis suggested that the speciﬁcity of
MS effectsmaybe based on the length of delay between threat induction
and subsequent defense (Martens, Burke, Schimel, & Faucher, 2011).
Drawing on the work of Whitson and Galinsky (2008), we created ten
scenarios, each of which comprised at least two potentially interrelated
events. Seeing connections between these events would be evidence for
conspiratorial or superstitious thinking, hence illusory pattern percep-
tion. There were four conspiracy- and six superstition-related scenarios;
one conspiracy- and one superstition-related scenario are given in
Appendix B in an English translation. Participants had to answer three
questions about the interrelatedness of the events for each scenario.
These questions were: “How unequivocal is the relationship between
the outcomeof the story and the preceding events?”, “Howunequivocally
does the outcome develop from the storyline?”, “In terms of the resultinglation, F(2,108) = 1.22, p = .30, negative affectivity (ten items; α = .87) was,
F(2,108) = 7.63, p = .001. Negative affectivity was higher in the control deprivation
condition (M = 1.71, SD = 0.81) than in the winter salience condition (M = 1.24,
SD = 0.29), p = .01. Negative affectivity in the MS condition (M = 1.43, SD = 0.44)
did not differ from both other conditions (ps > .10), thus replicating prior TMT re-
search. Treating this variable as a covariate in separate analyses did not change the re-
sults reported below in a substantial way. Therefore, we will not mention this variable
further.
Table 1
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for variables in Study 1.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
1. Self-esteem –
2. Illusory pattern perception .07 –
3. Ingroup defense − .10 .17 –
4. Dummy 1: MS vs. winter .02 .06 .03 –
5. Dummy 2: Control deprivation vs. winter .01 .20* .11 − .36** –
M 7.58 2.81 4.99 0.25 0.43
SD 2.10 0.80 1.60 0.28 0.45
Fig. 1.Moderated mediation-related design of Study 1. Boxes in bold type represent pairs of contrasts (one critical and one orthogonal contrast) pertaining to the threat induction.
Note: MS = mortality salience.
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Answering the ﬁrst two questions with high values (on a 6-point scale
where 1 = not at all and 6 = highly) and the last one with a low value
(1 = little, 6 = much) would indicate illusory pattern perception, since
it would imply the “identiﬁcation of a coherent andmeaningful interrela-
tionship among a set of random or unrelated stimuli” (Whitson &
Galinsky, 2008, p. 115). Negative, positive, and neutral outcomes from
the perspective of the protagonist were alternated. Overall, the illusory
pattern perception measure consisted of 30 items (α = .91).
Ingroup defense. The ingroup defense measure followed the mediator
block. It was conceptualized as derogation of leftist demonstrators
attacking the German Federal Armed Forces to which all participants
belonged. Two leaﬂets from these leftist groups were presented, each
of which sharply criticized the Federal Armed Forces with statements
like “Dismiss the Federal Armed Forces! Reader against militarization”
and “Detection of the enemy” in connection with the image of a soldier.
In addition, two pictures of leftist demonstrators were shown. Partici-
pants were asked to indicate to what extent they thought that the orig-
inators of these leaﬂets/posters should be publicly pilloried (item 1),
expelled from Germany (item 2), and deserve the worst (item 3) on a
10-point scale (from 1 = not at all to 10 = totally). Overall, this mea-
sure contained twelve items (α = .95).
Moreover, each leaﬂet and picture was accompanied by 15 adjec-
tives – eight positive ones (e.g., “intelligent”) and seven negative ones
(e.g., “evil”). Participants had to indicate to what extent the adjectives
described the demonstrators on the same 10-point scale. The positive
adjectives were recoded and a composite of all adjectives was formed
(60 items; α = .95). As both outgroup derogation measures were sig-
niﬁcantly correlated, r = .51, p b .001, they were aggregated to form
a broad measure of ingroup defense.
Self-esteem. Finally, a single-itemmeasure of global self-esteem (“I have
high self-esteem”) was presented (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski,
2001). A 10-point scale (from 1 = not at all to 10 = totally) was used.
We decided to present this measure after the manipulation to make it
impossible for the participants to boost their self-esteem by choosing
high values, since this could have bufferedMS effects on ingroup defense
(Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Instead, self-esteem was measured at the
end of the questionnaire (i.e., after the dependent variable). Crucially,
self-esteem was not affected by the manipulation (F = 0.02, p = .98),
suggesting that this measure reﬂects participants' self-esteem in the
sense of an enduring trait rather than a manipulation-biased state. All7 A few ﬁller items, such as “Have you or someone you know ever experienced
something like this?”, were included to distract the participants from the focal ques-
tions. Studies 2 and 3 also included some distractive items to counteract the centrality
of the focal measures.items within the respective instruments were presented in randomized
order. After data collection, respondents were thanked and debriefed.
Results and discussion
The intercorrelations and descriptive data of the study variables are
depicted in Table 1. To test our key hypothesis that bothMS and control
deprivation lead to illusory pattern perception for participants with low
self-esteem, and that illusory pattern perception mediates MS and con-
trol deprivation effects on ingroup defense, we performed moderated
mediation analyses (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007; Model 5) using
Mplus 6.12 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010). Thus, we expected critical Con-
trast A (+.333 = MS, +.333 = control deprivation,− .667 = winter
salience), in which MS and control deprivation were compared to
winter salience, to exert a positive effect on ingroup defense via illusory
pattern perception, but only for persons with low self-esteem. On the
contrary, orthogonal Contrast B (+.5 = MS, − .5 = control depriva-
tion, 0 = winter), in which MS and control deprivation were directly
compared, should not attain signiﬁcance, neither as main effect nor as
interaction with self-esteem (cf. Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003;
Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008).
First, we conducted hierarchical moderated regression analyses to
investigate the interaction between the manipulation and self-esteem
on the mediator illusory pattern perception, including Contrast A,
self-esteem, and Contrast B in Step 1. In Step 2, the interaction
terms of both contrasts with self-esteem were entered. In Step 1, no
signiﬁcant effects occurred (ps > .14). Step 2 revealed a signiﬁcant
increase of the explained variance in illusory pattern perception due to
the inclusion of the interaction terms, ΔR2 = .06, F(2,110) = 3.52,
p b .05. Subsequent analyses disclosed a signiﬁcant interaction of
Contrast A and self-esteem on illusory pattern perception, b = − .18,
SE = .08, β = − .24, t(110) = −2.39, p b .05, such that persons
with low self-esteem (SD = −1) exhibited higher illusory patternNote. N = 83–116 for all correlations. Dummy 1: MS = 1, control deprivation = 0,
winter salience = 0. Dummy 2: MS = 0, control deprivation = 1, winter salience = 0.
All relationships between the dummy variables and the other variables are represented
by standardized regression coefﬁcients, whereby Dummy 1 and Dummy 2 were
simultaneously entered as predictors. * p = .057, ** p b .001.
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persons confronted with winter, b = .62, SE = .22, β = .39, t(110) =
−0.71, p = .48. Moreover, similar to the non-signiﬁcant main effect of
Contrast B, the interaction between Contrast B and self-esteem was not
signiﬁcant either, b = .08, SE = .12, β = .08, t(110) = 0.67, p = .50
(see Fig. 2). Thus, our predictions concerning the mediator model were
corroborated.
Then, we analyzed the dependent variable model, testing our hy-
pothesis that illusory pattern perception is positively associated with
ingroup defense but again only for persons with low self-esteem. As
with the mediator model, we included the same terms as predictors,
this time additionally entering illusory pattern perception and its inter-
action with self-esteem. Moderation analyses determined a signiﬁcant
interaction between illusory pattern perception and self-esteem,
b = − .28, SE = .11, β = − .29, t(108) = −2.57, p = .01, such that a
positive effect of illusory pattern perception on ingroup defense oc-
curred for individuals with low self-esteem (SD = −1), b = 0.99,
SE = .32, β = .50, t(108) = 3.08, p b .01, but not high self-esteem
(SD = 1), b = − .18, SE = .29, β = − .09, t(108) = −0.62, p = .54
(see Fig. 3). No other reliable effects occurred in both steps (ps > .05).8
Our predictions were therefore supported.
Next, we performed moderated mediation analyses to investigate
themediating role of illusory pattern perception. As per bootstrapping
procedure (5000 bootstrap samples), it was found that illusory
pattern perception signiﬁcantly mediated the effect of Contrast A
on ingroup defense when self-esteem was low (indirect effect
(b) = .61, 95% bias-corrected conﬁdence interval [BC CI] of .16 to
1.33) but not when self-esteem was high (indirect effect = .03, 95%
BC CI of − .10 to .38).9 We also checked reverse mediation, entering
ingroup defense asmediator and illusory pattern perception as criteri-
on, without ﬁnding any signiﬁcant indirect effects. Thus our key
hypothesis was corroborated: MS/control deprivation increased8 The interaction between Contrast A and self-esteem on ingroup defense attained
signiﬁcance in the dependent variable model (i.e., direct effect of the interaction),
b = .47, SE = .21, β = .31, t(108) = 2.22, p b .05. However, this effect disappeared
when using bias-corrected bootstrap estimates (b) (5000 draws; 95% conﬁdence inter-
val of− .01 to .96), contrary to all other effects, which remained signiﬁcant when using
bootstrap estimates. As the simple slopes were also non-signiﬁcant (ps > .06), we do
not discuss this effect further.
9 These analyses were recomputed using dummy variables instead of the contrasts.
The indirect effect of control deprivation on ingroup defense was signiﬁcant for per-
sons with low self-esteem (indirect effect = .81, 95% BC CI of .15 to 1.71), but not high
self-esteem (indirect effect = .02, 95% BC CI of − .15 to .42). The indirect effect of MS
was marginally signiﬁcant for persons with low self-esteem (indirect effect = .42, 90%
BC CI of .03 to .99), but not high self-esteem (indirect effect = .03, 90% BC CI of− .07 to
.37).ingroup defense via illusory pattern perception for persons with low
self-esteem. Contrast B exerted no signiﬁcant indirect effects on
ingroup defense (regardless of the self-esteem level), indicating that
MS and control deprivation exerted statistically indistinguishable
effects on ingroup defense through illusory pattern perception.
Study 1 provides evidence for the notion that death-reminded as
well as control-deprived people engage in a motivated search for
(external) order when lacking self-esteem (i.e., personal control).
This most elementary instance of control motivation (Kay et al., 2009)
brought them to subsequently defend their ingroup, since this may
allow for a control restoration on the group-level (Fritsche et al.,
2008). Therefore, the assumption that MS effects on ingroup defense
are rooted in control motivation, which is activated by death reminders
that entail a loss of control, is consistentwith our results. These ﬁndings
may be especially important because they not only demonstrate
that MS and control deprivation operate similarly after quite a long
delay but also show that illusory pattern perception mediates their
effects on ingroup defense, thus pointing to a common underlying
mechanism— the motivated search for order (i.e., control motivation).
Hence, Study 1 provided the ﬁrst mediational evidence for the idea that
terror management may be sometimes functionally equivalent to con-
trol restoration (Pyszczynski et al., in press).
However, one could argue that our threat manipulation was not
pure enough to ensure that the change in the dependent variables
was only due to different intensities of control deprivation and the
resultant control motivation. Although the poems used were matched
in length, style, and content as far as possible, some differences in con-
tent remained. Each poem addressed the problems people face due to
the threats of death, lack of control, and winter but these problems
were not identical. Yet, this issue has been addressed in a pilot study
(see footnote 5) and is fully resolved in Studies 2 and 3 where other in-
ductions were employed.
Study 2
In Study 2, an important missing link of Study 1 was addressed:
Although the MS/control deprivation-induced control motivation
(search for order through illusory pattern perception) and group-
based control restoration (ingroup defense) indirectly suggested that
a loss of control must have occurred, which probably necessitated con-
trol restoration in the ﬁrst place, this reduction of perceived control has
not been explicitly demonstrated. Therefore, Study 2 tested whether
perceptions of randomness are similarly augmented by MS and control
deprivation.We operationalized reduced perceived control as increased
perceptions of randomness in line with the compensatory control
model, which states that the primary motivation behind control depri-
vation effects is the need to perceive order and prevent perceptions of
10 All poems were perceived as equally moving and impressive, F(2, 70) = 0.78,
p = .46, as indicated by an omnibus ANOVA.
11 As expected, the boredom-related poem (M = 4.51, SD = 2.27) was perceived as
signiﬁcantly more meaningless than the other poems (M = 3.42, SD = 1.34), which
exhibited equal meaninglessness levels (Contrast A: F(1, 71) = 6.46, p = .01,
ηp2 = .08; Contrast B: F(2, 70) = 0.33, p = .57, ηp2 = .005). However, entering this
variable as a covariate in separate analyses did not change the results reported below
in a substantial way. Therefore, we will not mention this variable further.
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ceived as a motivated search for order (i.e., control) (Kay et al., 2009),
we considered it important to test whether MS and control deprivation
are similarly capable of evoking concerns about order by engendering
perceptions of randomness.
In addition, Study 2 was designed to confront a possible meaning-
related criticism of Study 1. Proulx and Heine (2010) argued that MS
and control deprivation could be viewed as instances of meaning depri-
vation, and illusory pattern perception constitutes efforts in meaning
maintenance.We therefore compared the effects ofMS and control dep-
rivation with another aversive condition that was supposed to deprive
participants of meaning. Speciﬁcally, we induced boredom salience be-
cause boredom has been shown to create a sense of meaninglessness
(Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012), as well as ingroup defense via augmenting
the need for meaning (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011).
Participants had to read a poem about death, lack of control, or bore-
dom. Then, they had to indicate to what extent they perceived the
poems as meaningful. In addition, items pertaining to the impressive-
ness of the poems were given to ensure that all poems were perceived
as equally impressive, since variation in this variable may have con-
founded our ﬁndings as well. Next, participants were asked to indicate
how far they were inclined to think about certain topics due to the
poems. We expected that death thoughts would prevail among the in-
dividuals in the death condition relative to both other conditions. Fur-
thermore, low control cognition was predicted to be particularly high
in the control deprivation as well as MS condition, as our approach
states that death deprives people of control in a global and fundamental
sense. Finally, thoughts of boredomwere hypothesized to predominate
in the boredom condition relative to the other conditions. In addition to
the death, lack of control, and boredom topics, several further subjects
were presented to control for variation regarding the propensities for
dwelling on certain other topics that might have been made salient to
differing extents by the poems. Lastly, a measure of randomness per-
ceptions (Krampen, 1991) was applied to test the notion that people
perceive their lives as more randomly determined (i.e., less controllable)
afterMS and control deprivation than boredom salience. This decrease in
perceived control should bemediated by thoughts about lacking control.
Method
Participants and design
Eight participants who failed to respond to the randomness percep-
tions measure, and six outliers of more than 3 SDs above the average
processing duration of the online questionnaire were excluded due to
suspicion that they were taking breaks or doing other activities during
completion of the questionnaire, leaving a ﬁnal sample of 73 partici-
pants, who studied at the University of Salzburg, Austria. Their mean
age was 25.3 years (SD = 7.0; range: 19–56), 89.0% female. They
were invited via a university mailing list to take part in an online
study about personality psychology and psychology of literature, and
were randomly assigned to conditions in a one-factor (MS vs. control
deprivation vs. boredom salience) between-participants design with
threat thoughts asmediators and perceptions of randomness as depen-
dent variable.
Procedure and materials
Manipulation. The online questionnaire opened with instructions
followed by some sociodemographic questions. Then, participants re-
ceived the manipulation, which consisted of three conditions. The con-
trol deprivation condition was equal to the one used in Study 1. The
other two conditions – MS and boredom salience – were newly devel-
oped and exactly tailored to the control deprivation condition regarding
the poems' content except that the words “global lack of control”
(Ohnmacht in German) were replaced by the words “death” in the
death condition and “boredom” in the boredom condition. So, bycreating new poems that were completely equal to the control depriva-
tion poem in terms of content (except for one crucial word realizing the
manipulation) we aimed at ruling out alternative explanations that
could have been possible due to different issues mentioned in the
poems of Study 1. Following the reading of the poem, participants were
asked to what extent they felt the poems were impressive and moving
(three items; α = .68).10 Furthermore, participants had to indicate how
far they perceived the poems as meaningless (six items; α = .85).11
Threat-related thoughts (mediators). Then, participants were asked to
indicate to what extent they were inclined to think about certain
topics because of the poems. These topics were selected in pre-tests
in the following way. Three independent raters unaware of our hy-
potheses categorized 83 participants' interpretations of the poems,
which had been generated in a separate study using a different partic-
ipant sample. The interpretations were categorized into topics that
were mentioned in the interpretations (e.g., death, lack of control).
The categories formed by the absolute majority of raters (two out of
three) served as the basis for the threat-related thoughts measure.
These were death, global lack of control, and boredom. Thus, only the
main themes of the poems were mentioned, suggesting that our
content-matching strategy was successful. Additionally, ﬁve ﬁller
items were included in the list of threat-related thoughts: bus, desk,
book, pear, and bag. Moreover, the topics helplessness, winter, warmth,
love, light, and springwere included in this list, since they were select-
ed in the pilot study pertaining to Study 1 (see footnote 5), and both
studies were run in the same session. Thoughts of lacking control and
helplessness were aggregated for the analyses reported below, since
they were highly correlated, r = .52, p b .001. All items mentioned
after the manipulation also acted as a delay, which is necessary for
MS and control deprivation effects to appear (Fritsche et al., 2008).
Perceptions of randomness. Finally, we gauged perceptions of random-
ness using the subscale “chance control orientation” of the questionnaire
Fragebogen zu Kontroll- und Kompetenzüberzeugungen [questionnaire on
locus of control and competence] (Krampen, 1991). This measure re-
ﬂects the greatest possible lack of control in that many life events are
thought to be contingent on chance, thus being beyond personal and
external control, since randomness implies fundamental disorder and
uncontrollability. The scale contained eight items (e.g., “A lot of what
happens in my life depends on chance”, “Fortuitous events determine
a large part of my life”, “It is a matter of pure chance if other people
conform to my wishes”; α = .72). After concluding data collection,
respondents were thanked and debriefed. All items were presented in
randomized order and answered on a 10-point scale.
Results and discussion
The intercorrelations and descriptive data of the study variables
are depicted in Table 2. Both threat-related poems (MS and control
deprivation) signiﬁcantly increased thoughts about both death and
lacking control relative to the boredom poem. However, whereas
thoughts of death were higher in the MS condition than in the control
deprivation condition (as indicated by the positive effect of Contrast
B; see Fig. 4), thoughts of low control were equal following MS and
Table 2
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for variables in study 2.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Thoughts of death –
2. Thoughts of low control .34** –
3. Thoughts of boredom − .56*** − .22† –
4. Perceptions of randomness .19 .32** − .10 –
5. Dummy 1: MS vs. boredom .83*** .24* − .86*** .22† –
6. Dummy 2: Control
deprivation vs. boredom
.25** .43*** − .74*** .19 − .40*** –
M 5.47 7.59 5.22 4.62 0.29 0.29
SD 3.67 2.43 3.88 1.26 0.46 0.46
Note. N = 73 for all correlations. Dummy 1: MS = 1, control deprivation = 0, winter
salience = 0. Dummy 2: MS = 0, control deprivation = 1, boredom salience = 0. All
relationships between the dummy variables and the other variables are represented by
standardized regression coefﬁcients, whereby Dummy 1 and Dummy 2 were
simultaneously entered as predictors. † p b .10, * p b .05, ** p b .01, *** p b .001.
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trast B; see Fig. 4). Accordingly, thoughts of death were positively
linked to thoughts of low control. Yet, solely contemplating low control
was predictive of randomness perceptions. Thus, the poems affected
participants' cognitions in line with our expectations.
We performed multiple mediation analyses to test our key predic-
tion that thoughts of low control uniquely mediate MS/control depri-
vation effects on perceptions of randomness using Mplus 6.12
(Muthén & Muthén, 2010). We included critical Contrast A (+.333,
+.333,− .667) and orthogonal Contrast B (+.5,− .5, 0) as predictors,
thoughts of low control, death, and boredom asmediators and random-
ness perceptions as dependent variable. Multiple mediation analyses
were performed following suggestions of Preacher and Hayes (2008).
The results are depicted in Fig. 4. Signiﬁcance tests of the indirect effects
can be found in Table 3. Whereas the total effect of Contrast A (MS and
control deprivation vs. boredom) on randomness perceptions was
signiﬁcant, the direct effect was not. Contrast B (MS vs. control depriva-
tion) exerted no signiﬁcant effects (neither total nor direct and indirect)
on the dependent variable. As predicted, MS/control deprivation in-
creased perceptions of randomness uniquely through thoughts of low
control, suggesting that people tend to perceive their lives asmore ran-
domly determined (i.e., less controllable) speciﬁcally due to low control
cognition after MS and control deprivation.12
Thus, an important missing link of Study 1 was ﬁlled by ﬁnding
evidence for a global loss of control in response to the threat induction.
This decrease in perceived control manifested as perceptions of ran-
domness that are likely to underlie the compensatory control processes,
which occurred in Study 1 in the form of illusory pattern perception and
ingroup defense.13 The uniquemediating role of thoughts about lacking
control is particularly noteworthy because it suggests that the motiva-
tional process connecting MS and control deprivation to compensatory
order-offering responses, such as ingroup defense, may be represented
by control motivation. Critically, MS and control deprivation effects
were statistically indistinguishable concerning thoughts of low control
and randomness perceptions but different with regard to dwelling on
death. This suggests that although MS produces more death-related
thinking than control deprivation, MS-provoked contemplations of
low control may play a particularly important role in terror manage-
ment by instigating randomness perceptions, illusory pattern percep-
tion, and ingroup defense. However, TMT posits that not explicit but
rather implicit death cognition (i.e., death-thought accessibility) as
measured by word-stem completing tasks underlies MS effects (Hayes12 These analyses were recomputed using dummy variables instead of the contrasts.
Both control deprivation and MS uniquely increased perceptions of randomness
through thoughts of low control relative to boredom salience (MS: indirect ef-
fect = .17, 95% BC CI of .004 to .47; control deprivation: indirect effect = .30, 95% BC
CI of .01 to .68). No other indirect effects attained signiﬁcance.
13 In a further study, we found evidence for the hypothesized link between percep-
tions of randomness and illusory pattern perception (Agroskin & Jonas, 2013).et al., 2010). As our threat thoughts measure was explicit, we included
a death-thought accessibility measure in Study 3.
Study 3
Study 3was designed to testwhether themediational role of control
motivation inMS effects on ingroup defensemay be reducible to under-
lying workings of implicit death cognition. TMT views the accessibility
of death-related thoughts as a critical cognitive determinant of compen-
satory responses toMS, positing that “in the face ofmortality awareness
DTA [death-thought accessibility] mediates, or at least partially medi-
ates, worldview and self-esteem defensiveness” (Hayes et al., 2010, p.
716). Accordingly, we considered it important to examine if heightened
levels of control motivation are amere epiphenomenon or byproduct of
increased death-thought accessibility, whichmight act as themore fun-
damental determinant of MS-induced ingroup defense. By including
death-thought accessibility in addition to controlmotivation as a poten-
tial mediator, we aimed at disentangling death-speciﬁc from control-
related processes in the emergence of threat-based ingroup defense.
As a measure of control motivation, we used state need for structure
(or order), which may be a promising candidate of mediating control
deprivation effects on ingroup defense, since it has been shown to rise
after control deprivation similar to illusory pattern perception (Whitson
& Galinsky, 2008). Notably, need for structure has also been assumed to
rise after MS (Dechesne & Kruglanski, 2004; Richter & Kruglanski,
2004). It was moreover demonstrated that persons with high trait need
for structure react with particular aversion to anything ambiguous and
confusing, such as behaviorally inconsistent targets and modern art
(Landau, Greenberg, Solomon, Martens, & Pyszczynski, 2006; Landau et
al., 2004). Thus, the hypothesized mediating role of state need for struc-
ture may parallelize the moderating role of trait need for structure. Sum-
ming up, two distinct routes fromMS and control deprivation to ingroup
defense are tested: One route links both MS and control deprivation to
ingroup defense via control motivation (state need for structure), where-
as the other route is represented by implicit death cognition, which
should be solely subject to MS (not control deprivation). Put differently,
we expected a MS-based increase in death-thought accessibility in addi-
tion to a MS/control deprivation-induced increase in control motivation.
According to TMT, death-thought accessibility should mediate MS effects
on ingroup defense either in addition to (i.e., partial mediation) or, as the
more fundamental process, instead of control motivation (i.e., total
mediation) (Hayes et al., 2010).
Moreover, in replication of Study 1,MS and control deprivation effects
on control motivation should be moderated by self-esteem, contrary to
the MS effect on death-thought accessibility, since MS usually exerts
main effects on implicit death cognition (Hayes et al., 2010). Furthermore,
we made use of another operationalization of ingroup defense, including
four different measures of ingroup bias, to expand our approach. Speciﬁ-
cally, we used two general measures of ingroup favoritism – ethnocen-
trism and anti-immigration attitudes – and two measures of outgroup
derogation thatweremore concrete, as they featured concrete outgroups,
namely Muslims. Finally, in order to enhance the comparability of our
ﬁndings with past TMT and compensatory control research, we used
the classic manipulations of MS (Rosenblatt et al., 1989) and control
deprivation (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).
Method
Participants and design
The sample mainly consisted of Austrian and German college
students, recruited via university mailing lists.14 To preserve high14 Participants' nationality did not affect the results reported below, and thus is not
mentioned further. The sample included three Muslims who were dropped from all
analyses that included Muslims-related measures.
Fig. 4. The effects of the threat induction (coded as Contrast A and Contrast B) on perceptions of randomness through threat-related thoughts. Boxes in bold type represent pairs of
contrasts (one critical and one orthogonal contrast) pertaining to the threat induction. Unstandardized regression coefﬁcients (b) and standard errors (SE; in brackets) are indicated. The
total effects of Contrast A and B on perceptions of randomness are noted above the direct effects. Signiﬁcant effects are highlighted in bold type (p b .05). Note: MS = mortality salience.
1152 D. Agroskin, E. Jonas / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49 (2013) 1144–1158data quality, only non-psychology students who followed instruc-
tions and were unlikely to have been distracted by other people or
other activities (e.g., writing emails, chatting) during the comple-
tion of the online questionnaire were included in the sample,
which contained 144 participants. The mean age was 23.9 years
(SD = 5.3; range: 17–55), 65.3% of the participants were female.
They participated in a study about societal questions and personality
psychology. Theywere randomly assigned to conditions in amoderated
multiple mediational between-participants design.
Procedure and materials
Self-esteem. The online questionnaire opened with instructions. Then,
half the participants received the threat induction; these participants
were given some personality measures (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991;
Robins et al., 2001, among others) in the end of the study. The other
half of the participants was given the personality items ﬁrst and then
the manipulation. We complemented the single-item measure of
self-esteem (Robins et al., 2001) used in Study 1 with the six mostTable 3
Indirect effects in Study 2.
Contrast A
(.333, .333, − .667)
Contrast B (.5, − .5, 0)
Bootstrap results for indirect effects
95% BC CI 95% BC CI
Indirect
effect
Lower Upper Indirect
effect
Lower Upper
Mediators
Total indirect effect − .48 −1.87 .90 − .26 − .90 .38
Thoughts of death − .02 − .52 .49 − .02 − .54 .54
Thoughts of low control .24 .02 .56 − .13 − .46 .003
Thoughts of boredom − .70 −1.94 .57 − .11 − .46 .05
Magnitude and conﬁdence intervals of the unstandardized multiple mediation effects
of the threat induction (coded as Contrast A –MS and control deprivation vs. boredom
salience – and Contrast B – MS vs. control deprivation without boredom salience) on
perceptions of randomness with threat-related thoughts as mediators. Note: Boldface
type highlights a signiﬁcant effect as determined by the 95% bias corrected conﬁdence
interval (95% BC CI) and 10,000 bootstrap samples.reliable items from the State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES) of Heatherton
and Polivy (1991). Speciﬁcally, we used the two items with the highest
factor loadings per subscale as reported by Heatherton and Polivy
(1991). That is, we used two items from the Performance subscale
(e.g., “I feel as smart as others”), two from the Social subscale (e.g., “I
feel concerned about the impression I am making”; recoded), and two
from the Appearance subscale (e.g., “I feel satisﬁed with the way my
body looks right now”) (six items; α = .74). Both self-esteem mea-
sures were highly correlated, r = .68, p b .001, suggesting that they
could be aggregated to a composite measure to reliably reﬂect levels
of global self-esteem beyond situational ﬂuctuations.15 A six-point
scale was used for these items as for all others reported below.
Manipulation. To facilitate comparability of our ﬁndings with prior re-
search, the classic MS manipulation was used (e.g., Rosenblatt et al.,
1989). It consists of two open-ended questions about what will physi-
cally happen to the individual when dying and after having died, as
well as which emotions the thought about one's own death triggers.
Control deprivation was induced by means of two open-ended
questions as well. The ﬁrst question asked participants to recall and de-
scribe a negative situation over which they had no control, although
they had tried to control it. The second question asked about partici-
pants' physical experience in the situation and about their thoughts
and feelings.
The aversive control condition was matched to the control depri-
vation condition by asking participants about a negative situation
over which they had control. All formulations in these two conditions
were held equal as far as possible. Note that this is the classic way
to manipulate control in compensatory control research, and this
manipulation has been validated by several researchers investigating
compensatory control processes (Kay et al., 2008; Rutjens et al., 2013;
Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).
As a ﬁller questionnaire, we next included a German version of the
20-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Krohne et al., 1996;
Watson et al., 1988). In line with prior TMT research, themanipulation15 Levels of self-esteem were not affected by presentation order, F(1,142) = 0.01,
p = .92. Neither did the manipulation affect self-esteem for those participants who
were given the self-esteem measure after the manipulation, F(2,71) = 0.33, p = .72.
Table 4
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for variables in Study 3.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Self-esteem –
2. Need for structure − .30** –
3. Death-thought accessibility − .13 .12 –
4. Ingroup defense − .09 .36** .09 –
5. Dummy 1: MS vs. control .03 − .03 .22* .08 –
6. Dummy 2: Control deprivation
vs. control
− .03 .03 .02 .08 − .63** –
M 3.98 3.69 0.52 2.77 0.44 0.33
SD 0.90 0.96 0.84 0.73 0.50 0.47
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block followed consisting of death-thought accessibility, state need for
structure, and another questionnaire, which should ensure a sufﬁciently
long delay between the manipulation and the dependent variable,
ingroup defense (Martens et al., 2011).
Need for structure. The personal need for structure scale was used
(Machunsky & Meiser, 2006; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). This mea-
sure consists of twelve items (α = .86) and gauges the need to per-
ceive structure and order by assessing how far persons are inclined
to structure the world into a simpliﬁed, more controllable form.
Example items are “I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of
life” and “It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what
I can expect from it”. The items were slightly modiﬁed to tap into
state levels of the need for structure.
Death-thought accessibility. Death-thought accessibility was gauged
with a word-stem completion task used before by Jonas and Fischer
(2006). It was composed of 24 different word fragments to be com-
pleted by the participants. For six of these word fragments, either a
death-related word such as grave, corpse, and cofﬁn or a neutral
word could be inserted. The other word fragments functioned as ﬁller
items. The death-thought accessibility scale was computed by adding
the word fragments that were completed with death-related words;
its possible range was zero to ﬁve.16 Participants were instructed to
complete the word fragments with the ﬁrst word that came to their
mind, working as quickly as possible, to prevent them from substituting
death words with other, more pleasant words. One further scale
followed the mediator block to provide a delay between death-thought
accessibility and the subsequent ingroup defense measures. Since gaug-
ing death-thought accessibility can prompt conscious death cognition
per se, a delay was required to allow for a renewed post-suppression in-
crease of death-thought accessibility outside of focal awareness, which is
necessary for MS effects to occur (Hayes et al., 2010). After that, ingroup
defense was measured.
Ingroup defense. Ingroup defense was assessed in a very broadmanner
by including four measures for different aspects of ingroup bias. Specif-
ically, we included six items gauging general ethnocentrism, whereby
ethnocentrism was conceptualized as ethnic group self-centeredness,
with four intergroup expressions of ingroup preference, superiority,
purity, and exploitativeness, and two intragroup expressions of group
cohesion and devotion (Bizumic, Duckitt, Popadic, Dru, & Krauss,
2009). Each ethnocentrism facet was measured by one item (six
items; α = .78). Example items are “We, as a cultural group, should
be more integrated and cohesive, even if it reduces our individual free-
doms” (group cohesion) and “No matter what happens, I will always
support my cultural or ethnic group and never let it down” (devotion).
This short form of Bizumic et al.'s (2009) ethnocentrism scale has been
previously used by Agroskin and Jonas (2010) and was found to be
positively associated with trait measures of perceived low control in
the political and economic domains, need for closure, avoidance of em-
pathy, right-wing authoritarianism, and anti-immigration attitudes.
Furthermore, four items gauging anti-immigration attitudes were
included (α = .83). These items reﬂect generalized antagonism toward
immigration. Example items are “The economy of my home country
should be protected from mass immigration” and “I think the govern-
ment of my home country should make the immigration of foreigners
more difﬁcult”.
In addition to these measures of ingroup defense and favoritism, two
measures of outgroup derogationwere included. In contrast to the rather16 One death word ‘Grab’ (‘grave’ in English) had to be omitted because we had inad-
vertently used a similar word fragment ‘Grau’ (‘grey’ in English) as an example in the
instruction to the task, thereby biasing participants' completions of the death word.abstract ingroup defenses, the outgroup derogation measures referred to
a concrete outgroup, namely Muslims. In one case the Muslims featured
an Islamist (i.e., radical Muslim) worldview, that is, a worldview that
was incompatible with the worldview of the participants. In the other
case, theMuslims exhibited a pro-democraticworldview, that is, a com-
patible worldview. This variation in worldview compatibility was
implemented to testwhether even outgroupmembers with compatible
worldviews might be derogated after MS and control deprivation,
which would be evidence for an especially narrow-minded form of
ingroup bias (i.e., pure xenophobia). Speciﬁcally, in the case of the
Islamists, a picture of radical Muslim demonstrators holding posters
with statements like “Islam will conquer Europe”, “Islamwill dominate
the world”, and “Shariah the true solution”was presented. After a brief
explanation of the context of the demonstration and central notions like
“Shariah” that someparticipantsmayhave been unfamiliarwith, partic-
ipants answered eleven items (α = .86) reﬂecting derogation of the
demonstrators, such as “They deserve the worst” and “I like them”
(recoded).
In the case of the pro-democratic Muslims, a picture of Iranian
Muslim demonstrators holding a poster with the statement “We
want democracy”was presented. After a brief explanation of the context
of the demonstration, participants were asked to answer the same items
aswith the Islamists except for one unsuitable item (ten items;α = .76).
All four ingroup biasmeasureswere aggregated for the subsequent statis-
tical analyses, since we assumed them to be expressions of the same un-
derlying construct — ingroup defense. This was justiﬁed as suggested by
their high interrelations (α = .79). Then, sociodemographic data was
collected. After completing data collection, respondents were thanked
and debriefed.
Results and discussion
The interrelations and descriptive data are depicted in Table 4.
Most notably, need for structure predicted ingroup defense, contrary
to death-thought accessibility, suggesting that need for structure may
bemore likely to mediate moderated threat effects on ingroup defense.
Moreover, the negative relationship between self-esteem and need for
structure indicates that high self-esteem (i.e., personal control; Judge
et al., 2002; Pyszczynski et al., in press) can buffer against the need for
external control. This is consistent with the hydraulic hypothesis of the
compensatory control model (Kay et al., 2010b).
The hypothesized model was tested in two steps corresponding to
two different ways of coding the manipulation variable. With respect
to need for structure the same two contrasts (Contrast A and B) used
in the previous studies were utilized, since we wanted to test again
whether MS and lacking control differ from having control (Contrast A)
and from each other (Contrast B).We expected Contrast A to exert a pos-
itive effect on need for structure under conditions of low but not high
self-esteem. In contrast, Contrast B should not attain signiﬁcance becauseNote. N = 141–144 for all correlations. Dummy 1: MS = 1, control deprivation = 0,
control condition = 0. Dummy 2: MS = 0, control deprivation = 1, control
condition = 0. All relationships between the dummy variables and the other
variables are represented by standardized regression coefﬁcients, whereby Dummy 1
and Dummy 2 were simultaneously entered as predictors. * p b .05, ** p b .001.
19 We performed many additional analyses to check whether death-thought accessi-
bility might somehow affect ingroup defense. Speciﬁcally, we explored the effects of
death-thought accessibility on each ingroup bias measure separately, without ﬁnding
any signiﬁcant effects (βs ≤ .10, ps > .20). Need for structure, by contrast, affected
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death-thought accessibility).
With regard to death-thought accessibility, two new contrasts were
formed because we were interested in the extent to which MS diverged
from lacking control and having control (critical Contrast C: +.667 =
MS,− .333 = control deprivation,− .333 = control condition). In addi-
tion, we tested whether death-thought accessibility was only inﬂuenced
by MS, comparing lacking control and having control without MS
(orthogonal Contrast D: +.5 = control deprivation, − .5 = control
condition, 0 = MS). We predicted Contrast C to exert a positive effect
on death-thought accessibility. In addition, Contrast D should not attain
signiﬁcance, as death-thought accessibility should be uniquely engen-
dered byMS, suggesting equal death-thought accessibility levels across
both other conditions.
Since the mediators need for structure and death-thought accessibili-
ty featured different predictors, themodel had to be computed twice, one
timewith Contrast C and D predicting bothmediators, and a second time
with Contrast A and B (as well as their interactions with self-esteem),
doing the same. The dependent variable ingroup defense was modeled
as a latent variable, constituted by the four ingroup bias measures, func-
tioning as manifest indicators. The direct effects of the independent vari-
ableswere set to zero, since therewere no reliable direct effects in Studies
1 and 2. To test this model (Fig. 5), we performed moderated multiple
mediation analyses using Mplus 6.12 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010).17 A
very good data ﬁt – as indicated by a non-signiﬁcant Chi-Square Test as
well as a low Root Mean Square Error Of Approximation (RMSEA) and
a high Comparative Fit Index (CFI) – was obtained, χ2(35) = 32.45,
p = .59, RMSEA = 0.000 (90%CI of 0.000 to 0.054), CFI = 1.000. This in-
dicates that our theoretical model was highly consistent with the data.
First, the interaction of the threat induction and self-esteem on need
for structure is addressed. In Step 1, only a negative link between
self-esteem and need for structure emerged, b = − .37, SE = .08,
β = − .35, t(138) = −4.44, p b .001 (all other ps > .22). A marginal
change in explained variance due to the inclusion of the interaction
terms was observable in Step 2, ΔR2 = .03, F(2, 136) = 2.36, p b .10
(one-tailed testing due to replication of Study 1 would yield a signiﬁcant
effect, p b .05). Consistent with our predictions, Contrast A affected need
for structure as a function of self-esteem, b = − .48, SE = .22,β = − .19,
t(136) = −2.20, p b .05, such that MS and lacking control increased
need for structure relative to having control under conditions of low
self-esteem (SD = −1), b = .46, SE = .27, β = .20, t(136) = 1.73,
p b .05 (one-tailed due to replication),18 but not high self-esteem
(SD = 1), b = − .41, SE = .26, β = − .18, t(136) = −1.57, p = .12
(Fig. 6). MS and control deprivation exerted statistically indistinguishable
effects on need for structure as indicated by a non-signiﬁcant interaction
between Contrast B and self-esteem, b = − .03, SE = .18, β = − .01,
t(136) = −0.14, p = .89. Hence, our hypotheses for need for structure
were corroborated.
Next, we investigated the threat-based emergence of death-thought
accessibility by testing whether it may be uniquely increased by MS.
Indeed, a signiﬁcant effect of Contrast C appeared, b = .35, SE = .14,
β = .21, t(138) = 2.58, p = .01, suggesting that death-thought acces-
sibility was higher after MS than after lacking/having control. Contrast
D, conversely, did not predict death-thought accessibility, b = .04,17 Two variables were entered as covariates to rule out possible confounds: The pre-
sentation order of the moderator self-esteem (before the manipulation vs. after the de-
pendent variable) and age, which was associated with the presentation order,
r = − .15, p b .10 (especially in the control deprivation condition, r = − .29, p b .05;
relationships in both other conditions non-signiﬁcant, rs b − .13, ps > .49), such that
participants who received the self-esteem measure prior to the manipulation were
marginally younger than those who received the self-esteem measure in the end of
the study. Moreover, age was marginally related to self-esteem in the control condi-
tion, r = − .33, p b .10, but in no other condition, rs b .16, ps > .28. One participant
did not respond to the age question and had to be excluded. However, the results were
not substantially different without including the covariates.
18 Analyzing this simple slope at SD = −1.5 yielded a signiﬁcant effect using a two-
tailed test, b = .68, SE = .35, β = .29, t(136) = 1.95, p = .05.SE = .18, β = .02, t(138) = 0.20, p = .84, indicating that death-
thought accessibility is in fact to be seen as a unique reaction to death
awareness. No other effects attained signiﬁcance including the interac-
tions with self-esteem (ps > .12). Thus, our predictions regarding
death-thought accessibility were supported as well.
Then, we tested whether ingroup defense was predicted by need
for structure and death-thought accessibility. Need for structure was
positively related to ingroup defense, b = .38, SE = .09, β = .32,
t(136) = 4.18, p b .001. Death-thought accessibility, by contrast, did
not affect ingroup defense, b = .08, SE = .11, β = .05, t(136) = 0.71,
p = .48. These results support the notion that control motivation
uniquely contributes to threat-based ingroup defense.19
Finally, we tested our mediational hypotheses. Speciﬁcally, we
examined the indirect effects of the manipulation on ingroup defense,
expecting MS and control deprivation (Contrast A) to amplify ingroup
defense via the need for structure under conditions of low self-esteem.
All indirect effects were computed using 95% bias corrected bootstrap
conﬁdence intervals (95% BC CI) and 10,000 bootstrap samples. As hy-
pothesized, Contrast A signiﬁcantly increased ingroup defense under con-
ditions of low self-esteem (indirect effect = .18, 95% BC CI of .014 to .46),
contrary to high self-esteem (indirect effect = − .16, 95% BC CI of− .44
to .05). No signiﬁcant indirect effects of Contrast B on ingroup defense
(irrespective of self-esteem levels) were found.20 Thus, MS and control
deprivation equally elicited ingroup defense via the need for structure
under conditions of low self-esteem.21
Study 3 provides a valuable contribution to our control-related
process model of MS effects on ingroup defense by replicating the
ﬁndings from Study 1 with another threat manipulation (we used
the traditional manipulations of MS and control deprivation), another
mediator reﬂecting control motivation (need for structure/order),
and another measure of ingroup defense (four different measures of
ingroup bias). Most importantly, Study 3 also included the main me-
diator candidate in TMT – death-thought accessibility –which did not
predict any ingroup defense measures, contrary to need for structure,
which predicted all of them (see footnote 19). It is important to note,
though, that death-thought accessibility was uniquely augmented by
MS after a ﬁller task in line with previous research (Hayes et al.,
2010). Consequently, death-thought accessibility's failure to mediate
MS effects on ingroup defense cannot be attributed to an inapt induc-
tion of MS. It therefore seems indicated to conclude that MS effects on
control-conveying outcomes are uniquely driven by control motiva-
tion. It is worthy of note, furthermore, that the very broad assessment
and latent modeling of ingroup defense, viewed in conjunction with
the excellent model ﬁt, speaks to the generalizability of our ﬁndings,
because this means that solely the common variance of the four
ingroup bias measures was predicted by need for structure. In con-
trast, the measures' unique variances were irrelevant, thus ruling
out methodological artifacts. Overall, Study 3 complements the ﬁrsteach measure (βs ≥ .23, ps b .01). We also examined whether death-thought accessi-
bility effects on ingroup defense may be moderated by the manipulation (e.g.,
appearing only in the MS condition) and self-esteem. No signiﬁcant effects appeared
among the two- and three-way interactions between these variables.
20 These analyses were recomputed using dummy variables instead of the contrasts.
The effect of control deprivation on ingroup defense was signiﬁcantly mediated by
need for structure for persons with low self-esteem (SD = −1; indirect effect = .19,
95% BC CI of .002 to .52) but not high self-esteem (SD = 1; indirect effect = − .14,
95% BC CI of -.44 to .11). Likewise, the effect of MS was signiﬁcantly mediated by need
for structure for persons with low self-esteem (SD = −1.25; indirect effect = .21,
95% BC CI of .003 to .53) but not high self-esteem (SD = 1.25; indirect effect = − .22,
95% BC CI of − .58 to .03).
21 In addition to controlling for the presentation order of the moderator, we
performed subgroup analyses that did not reveal substantial differences between the
respective conditions. Thus, this variable did not affect our results.
Fig. 5. Model tested in Study 3 (N = 141). Boxes in bold type represent pairs of contrasts (one critical and one orthogonal contrast, respectively) pertaining to the manipulation.
Manifest variables are rectangular, whereas the latent variable is spherical. Path coefﬁcients are described by unstandardized regression coefﬁcients (b) and standard errors (SE; in
brackets). Factor loadings are standardized regression coefﬁcients (β). Signiﬁcant effects are highlighted in bold type (p b .05). Note: MS = mortality salience.
1155D. Agroskin, E. Jonas / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49 (2013) 1144–1158two studies by showing that the mediating role of control motivation
cannot be reduced to underlying workings of implicit death cognition.
General discussion
The results of three studies shed light on the motivational underpin-
nings of MS and control deprivation effects on ingroup defense. In
Study 1, illusory pattern perception (i.e., the motivated search for
order/control) mediated the effects of MS and control deprivation on
ingroup defense (i.e., group-based control restoration). Study 3 replicat-
ed this mediation using another measure of control motivation — state
need for structure. This motivational process may be precisely reﬂective
of the need to perceive order and prevent perceptions of randomness,
which is the primary motivation behind control deprivation effects
according to the compensatory control model (Kay et al., 2009). Impor-
tantly, need for structure fulﬁlled its mediational function notwithstand-
ing the inclusion of death-thought accessibility, which is the key
mediator candidate in TMT (Hayes et al., 2010). Study 2 offered evidence2
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Fig. 6. The effects of mortality salience, control deprivation, and the control condition
on need for structure in Study 3. Plotted values reﬂect predicted need for structure
values at one standard deviation below and above the self-esteem mean. Scale ranges
from 1–6.for the increase in perceived randomness following MS and control dep-
rivation, thereby suggesting that ingroup defense may serve the need to
thwart perceptions of randomness. Crucially, the effects of MS and con-
trol deprivation were statistically indistinguishable with respect to all
control-relevant measures (illusory pattern perception, need for struc-
ture, ingroup defense, explicit thoughts of low control, perceptions of
randomness), but not the death-speciﬁc measures (explicit and implicit
thoughts of death); the latter ones were uniquely strongly affected by
MS. Moreover, the indirect effects of both MS and control deprivation
on ingroupdefensewere qualiﬁedby levels of self-esteem, only occurring
for persons with low self-esteem. Overall, this research provides the ﬁrst
comparative and, crucially, mediational examination of MS and control
deprivation effects on ingroup defense.
Implications for terror management theory
According to TMT, the need for control (i.e., the need to perceive
order and prevent perceptions of randomness; Kay et al., 2009) con-
stitutes a basic human motivation (Pyszczynski et al., in press). Fur-
thermore, death is thought to deprive people of control (this is
demonstrated by our ﬁndings in Study 2). Mortality reminders should
therefore increase the need for control (this is shown by our ﬁndings
in Studies 1 and 3). Finally, ingroup defense is ascribed the function of
coping with control threats by not only control theorizing (Fritsche et
al., 2011) but also TMT (Pyszczynski et al., in press). Thus, our key
ﬁnding that control motivation plays an equally decisive and unique
role in driving both MS and control deprivation effects on ingroup
defense seems to be in line with TMT. However, from the perspective of
TMT, people's control strivings serve the more fundamental, ultimate
psychological function of protecting from existential terror (Pyszczynski
et al., 1998). This reasoning suggests thatMS effectsmay be fueled by dif-
ferent processes located on different levels of motivational proximity to
the goal of terror management. In other words, the motivation to restore
controlmay serve amore proximate function of compensating for the lack
of control that is inherent inmortality followingMS,whereby these com-
pensatory control processesmay not be ends in themselves, butmeans of
attaining the ultimate goal—managing existential angst. Efforts in control
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of helping the individual “to feel that he controls his life and his death”
(Becker, 1973, p. 55). Whether this distinction between proximate
and ultimate functions of ingroup defense is viable is not addressed
by our data, and thus constitutes an exciting question for future research.
Irrespective of this possibility, our ﬁndings show that motivational
processes located atmore proximate levels of analysis, such as controlmo-
tivation, can make a unique and important mediational contribution to
the emergence of compensatory responses following death awareness.
It is noteworthy that controlmotivationmediatedMS/control deprivation
effects on ingroup defense in Study 3, whereas death-thought accessibil-
ity failed to mediate MS effects. In addition to demonstrating the unique-
ness and non-reducibility of themediational role of control motivation to
implicit death cognition, this ﬁnding suggests that death-thought accessi-
bilitymay not play a critical mediational role inMS effects on ingroup de-
fense. To our knowledge, there is not a single published study, reporting a
statistical mediation of MS effects on ingroup defense by death-thought
accessibility. In contrast, there is evidence suggesting that this might not
be the case. For example, a line of research failed to ﬁnd a mediation of
MS effects on ingroup defense in several studies (Das et al., 2009). In ad-
dition, a recent set of studies investigating the interactive effect ofMS and
intrinsic religiosity on ingroup defense did not determine a mediation by
death-thought accessibility as well (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Orehek, &
Abdollahi, 2012). Although a negative relation between intrinsic religios-
ity and death-thought accessibility appeared in the MS condition,
death-thought accessibility did not mediate the MS-induced decrease in
intergroup hostility among persons with high intrinsic religiosity. Thus,
our ﬁndings may be particularly valuable for understanding what goes
on in people's heads between MS inductions and ingroup defense.
Given that group-related worldview defense or ingroup defense repre-
sents the traditional andmost extensively investigated type of compensa-
tory response after diverse existential threats (cf. Routledge & Vess,
2012), our mediational insights into the motivational dynamics underly-
ing terror management and control restoration should be of interest to
the entire threat compensation literature.
The main theoretical contribution of our investigation may thus be
the provision of conceptual clarity about which motivational process
drives control-conferring compensatory responses to MS, namely the
need to perceive order and prevent perceptions of randomness (Kay
et al., 2009). This is of major importance since it has been pointed
out that similar effects of different threats (e.g., MS and control
deprivation) on a particular outcome (e.g., ingroup defense) do
not imply that those effects are driven by the same processes or
motivations, because the same outcome may result from different
motivational processes (Routledge & Vess, 2012). While it is not
disputed that “mortality salience, expectancy violations, threats to
personal control, or feelings of uncertainty can at times foster similar
outcomes in the laboratory”, Routledge and Vess (2012) emphasize
that “this does not, in and of itself, provide any conceptual clarity
about whether compensatory responses to these threats are fueled
by the same motivation or process” (p. 377). We believe that our
mediational approach to explaining ingroup defensemay be particular-
ly promising because it provides ‘non-difference’ evidence (MS vs.
control deprivation) in conjunction with mediational evidence.
Previous alternative perspectives to TMT, by contrast, only provided
‘non-difference’ evidence (e.g., MS vs. expectancy violation; Proulx &
Heine, 2008; cf. Routledge & Vess, 2012), without investigating the
underlying motivational dynamics via mediation analyses. Our media-
tional approach might therefore be especially helpful for differentiating
the multifarious worldview defenses with regard to their motivational
underpinnings: Which motivational process mediates MS effects on a
particular compensatory response? For instance, does the need for
order uniquely mediate MS effects on control-conveying outcomes, as
well as the need for certainty on certainty-providing outcomes, and
the need for death-transcendence on symbolic immortality-conferring
outcomes?A related question iswhether our ﬁndingsmean thatMS is function-
ally equivalent to control deprivation in general (i.e., irrespective of the
particular compensatory response)? It is imperative to note that our
control-related process model of MS effects is solely applicable to out-
comes that may offer a sense of control/order. Our approach is mute
about MS outcomes that are not likely to serve the desire for control
but rather other needs, such as the need for death-transcendence. It is
therefore quite improbable that MS effects on various manifestations
of this death-speciﬁc need (e.g., desire for offspring, Fritsche et al.,
2007; symbolic immortality, Shepherd et al., 2011) are mediated by
control motivation (see also footnote 1 and Routledge & Vess, 2012).
It may well be that MS effects on such outcomes are mediated by the
accessibility of thoughts related to death or immortality. Summing up,
our control-related account of MS effects pertains only to outcomes
that may enable people to restore control. Consequently, mortality
awareness should be only functionally equivalent to control deprivation
with respect to control-conveying types of worldview defense (e.g.,
ingroup defense; Fritsche et al., 2008). This means that, in general, MS
and control deprivation are not the same things. Accordingly, world-
view defense is not generally the same as control restoration, since
people's worldviews provide not only control but also other psycholog-
ical resources, such asmeaning, identity, and symbolic immortality. This
is in linewith TMTwhich posits that afﬁrmations of control,meaning, or
belongingness are ultimately strategies for terror management (instead
of being ends in themselves) (Pyszczynski et al., in press).Limitations and future research
Two possible limitations of our ﬁndings deserve special attention.
While our ﬁndings show that MS-immanent control deprivation signiﬁ-
cantly contributes to the emergence of ingroup defense followingmortal-
ity reminders, we cannot conclude that ingroup defense occurs solely due
to the control deprivation that death entails. It could also be, for instance,
that MS-immanent uncertainty drives MS effects in addition to control
deprivation (Van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & van den Ham,
2005). We cannot rule out this possibility since we did not include
uncertainty-related mediator candidates, neither did we include an un-
certainty condition in addition to MS and control deprivation. Thus, the
only two conclusions that our results certainly suggest are: a) there is a
signiﬁcant contributionof control deprivation to the emergence ofMS ef-
fects on ingroup defense and b) there is no signiﬁcant (mediational) con-
tribution of death-thought accessibility toMS effects on ingroup defense.
Further potential mediators including needs for certainty and meaning
await further investigation. It is worthy of note, however, that a
meta-analysis has determined that MS effects differ from meaningless-
ness and uncertainty effects in terms of their time course: While MS
effects tend to increase over time, meaninglessness and uncertainty
effects tend to decrease (Martens et al., 2011). Since we included several
delay tasks in all our experiments between threat induction and
outcome measurement, control deprivation seems to work similarly
lastingly to mortality awareness.
It is also important to note that our mediational approach essen-
tially entailed comparing control-speciﬁc and death-speciﬁc mediator
candidates with regard to the mediation of MS and control depriva-
tion effects on ingroup defense. Such an approach may work best
when the processes that compete for mediation are operationalized
in a similar fashion. In Study 3, we compared death-thought accessibil-
ity, measured with a word-stem completion task, with the need for
structure, measured with explicit items. These mediator variables
were selected because they are regarded as the main mediator candi-
dates in the respective literatures — death-thought accessibility in
TMT (Hayes et al., 2010) and need for structure in compensatory control
research (Kay et al., 2009). Yet, future research may compare mediator
candidates that are operationalized more similarly, such as implicit
death cognition vs. implicit low control cognition (similar to Study 2
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dom), to obtain a more balanced comparison of the mediating processes.
Future research may also explore in more detail which types of
worldview defense may be attributed to the desire for order and aver-
sion to randomness (i.e., control motivation) and which may not be.
As stated above, we believe thatMS effects on outcomes that are unlike-
ly to serve the control motive are not explainable by our approach. We
believe, for example, that MS effects on compensatory bolstering of ep-
istemic certainty may well be mediated by the MS-deprived need for
certainty (McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001), instead of the
need for control, regardless of whether uncertainty management ulti-
mately functions to assuage existential anxiety (Pyszczynski et al., in
press), or is an end in itself. This exploration of unique mediating pro-
cesses in existential threat research might be complemented by an in-
vestigation of unique moderating variables. While self-esteem buffered
both MS and control deprivation effects in Studies 1 and 3 – which is
in line with both TMT and control-related theorizing on the functional
similarity between self-esteem and personal control (Fritsche et al.,
2008; Pyszczynski et al., in press) – there may be personality traits
that speciﬁcally moderate certain threats but not others. For example,
a candidate variable for uniquely moderating MS effects might be the
belief in a Godwho provides literal immortality, as it is typical for intrin-
sic religiosity (Jonas & Fischer, 2006). The belief in a controlling God, by
contrast, may uniquely moderate control loss effects (Kay et al., 2008).
To conclude, ourmediationalﬁndings strongly suggest thatmortality
awareness is accompanied by a profound control deprivation that fuels
compensatory responses aimed at restoring a sense of order in the
world. Researchers investigating the contextual precursors and psycho-
logical functions of ingroup defenses, such as prejudice and xenophobia,
may therefore want to pay particular attention to the order-offering
features of these belief systems.
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Appendix A. Poems
1) Death-related poem
Final Act (Reiner Maria Rilke, 1917)
Death is grand.
We are his
With laughing mouths.
When we feel most alive,
He dares to cry
In the midst of us.
2) Lack of control-related poem
The Power (Rosemarie Brunetti, 2009)
The hardest and cruellest power,
which man has to accept,
is powerlessness.22
3) Winter-related poem
Winter, You Rough Man… (Fritz Lemmermayer, n.d.)
Winter, you rough man,
Winter, I do not love you!
Trembling due to your frost,
I strive upwards to the light.22 Please note that the translation of the materials is literal. The literal translation of
the German word Ohnmacht is “powerlessness”. However, this term rather means
global lack of control in the German language than powerlessness in the social domain,
which would be this term's meaning in the English language.Appendix B. Illusory pattern perception
1) Conspiracy-related scenario
You are working on a group project with three fellow students. The
project entails writing a term paper. Since you have questions
concerning the term paper which your colleagues cannot answer,
you visit your supervisor in her ofﬁce hour. As you open the door to
her study, you see that one of your colleagues is already talking to
the supervisor. You are asked to wait outside the room. While you
are waiting, you have the feeling that the topic of discussion in the
room is you. You have the feeling you heard your name being men-
tioned in the room. A few minutes later your colleague comes out
and you enter the room. During the conversation you feel as though
the supervisor is not very friendly to you, even though she answers
you questions. Youwrite the term paper a fewweeks later and are in-
formed of themark soon afterwards. It is not a goodmark and you are
surprised, as you have put a lot of work into it.
2) Superstition-related scenario
You attend a party in a shared apartment that a fellow student of
yours has invited you to. You get to know her roommates there; one
of them has quite an unusual hobby. She is engaged with voodoo.
She shows you her voodoo tools – dolls and needles – and explains
to you how the corresponding practices are performed. After the con-
versation you go on the balcony to smoke a cigarette and hear one of
the party guests saying that she is cold. Since you are cold aswell, you
go back inside to fetch your jacket. On theway to get your jacket, you
notice a voodoo doll on a desk wearing a green bodice that reminds
you of the color of the person's pullover whowas freezing on the bal-
cony. You lay the doll on the warm radiator for fun and return to the
balcony with your jacket. To your surprise, a few minutes later the
person with the green pullover says she feels it has become signiﬁ-
cantly warmer.
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